The International Politics of Eurasia: V. 6: The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia by S. Frederick Starr & Karen Dawisha

Author:S. Frederick Starr & Karen Dawisha [Starr, S. Frederick & Dawisha, Karen]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, General, Political Ideologies
ISBN: 9781315483719
Google: K78YDQAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 32207026
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2016-09-16T00:00:00+00:00

Nuclear Policy, Nuclear Diplomacy

Ukrainian nuclear policy in the last half of 1994 can be explained by Kravchuk’s need to balance the conflicting interests and orientations that define Ukrainian political life. Nuclear weapons represented real Ukrainian negotiating leverage. Kravchuk and his government could exchange Ukrainian nuclear disarmament for real gains, including economic benefits and security guarantees. Of greater importance, however, is that the interest of the United States in nuclear disarmament could be used to draw Washington in on other economic and security problems. As pressure from Moscow increased, Kravchuk could maintain his fragile coalition by bringing in Washington.

The history of Ukrainian nuclear policy and diplomacy of the past few years has yet to be written.28 From late 1991 to 1993, the Ukrainian government passed from a stage of romanticism about nuclear disarmament to a stubborn insistence that steps toward disarmament be linked to Ukraine’s broader security agenda and economic needs. It is my belief that the Kravchuk government—as opposed to various parties and individuals within Ukraine—never seriously contemplated permanent retention of nuclear weapons, particularly after the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons in the spring of 1992. Disruptions in the negotiation and implementation of agreements on nuclear disarmament, steps to assert administrative control over missile bases in Ukraine, and other statements and actions that increased anxiety in Washington may be directly traced to the broader security agenda described above, as well as the search for a broad strategic deal on nuclear matters and the rough-and-tumble of Ukraine’s internal political process. Such assertions oversimplify a complex reality but go farther to explain events than the view that Ukrainian policy has been a perpetual battle between nuclear hawks and doves.

In late 1992, the Ukrainian government, prodded by critics in the Rada, moved away from its earlier stress on “negative control” and dismantlement within Ukraine in favor of the notion that nuclear disarmament in Ukraine should be linked to specific economic and security conditions. President Kravchuk stated during a November 1992 press conference that Ukraine should have “appropriate compensation” for nuclear disarmament and that, in return for nuclear disarmament, Ukraine should also have “certain guarantees” for its security. These two basic categories—security guarantees and financial compensation and assistance—determined the diplomatic rhythm of 1993 in two ways: first, the Ukrainians themselves had to define those conditions; second, Ukraine, Russia, and the United States had to fashion a framework for Ukrainian nuclear disarmament that incorporated those conditions.

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